Mental disorder, psychological problems and terrorist behaviour: A systematic review and meta‐analysis

1.1. Inconsistent findings on mental health difficulties and risk of involvement in terrorism

There has been an increasing focus on the potential role of mental health difficulties in the process of violent radicalisation into terrorism. In part, this has been fuelled by studies appearing to show high prevalence rates in some samples of terrorists. However, findings are inconsistent, with some studies reporting higher rates than those observed in the general population, some lower, and others that are comparable to those observed in the general population.

1.2. What is this review about?

This review synthesises the prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples (Objective 1—Prevalence) and prevalence of mental health disorders pre‐dating involvement in terrorism (Objective 2—Temporality). The review also synthesises the extent to which mental health difficulties are associated with terrorist involvement compared to non‐terrorist samples (Objective 3—Risk Factor).

In addressing these objectives, the review offers an initial assessment of what we refer to as the mental health‐terrorism hypothesis (that mental health difficulties are a risk factor for terrorist involvement). Tentative support for the hypothesis would be provided where studies, when collated, suggest higher rates of difficulties in terrorist samples than those expected in the community.

The review distinguishes between mental disorders, suspected mental disorders and psychological problems. These are collectively termed mental health difficulties.

1.3. What studies are included?

For Objective 1, studies that report rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples are included. Studies were eligible even if the period after the terrorists became involved in terrorism is included. We identified 56 papers reporting on 73 terrorist samples that met this criterion.

For Objective 2, studies from Objective 1 were included where they specifically reported rates of difficulties and where those difficulties emerged before the terrorist became involved in terrorism (or was first detected as being involved). Ten studies were included in this component of the review.

Finally, for Objective 3, we included studies that compared rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples with non‐terrorist samples. Nine eligible studies were included here.

1.4. What are the findings of the review?

Our findings do not support the assertion that there are remarkably high rates of mental health difficulties in the terrorist population. As a benchmark, we estimate that the lifetime prevalence rate of diagnosed mental disorder in the general population is 29%. For Objective 1 (Prevalence) we report that the lifetime prevalence rate of diagnosed mental disorder in terrorist samples was 17.4%. This increased to 23.2% for the studies reporting lifetime prevalence rates of suspected disorder, and 28.5% for studies reporting any psychological problems.

At any one time, 14.4% of those involved in terrorism may have a disorder or suspected disorder (as opposed to a psychological problem). When we isolated studies that reported rates prior to either engagement in terrorism or detection for terrorist offences (Objective 2, Temporality), the lifetime prevalence rate for any psychological problem was 27.8%.

Finally, based on single study estimates, the odds of having a lifetime history of mental health difficulties between those involved in terrorist behaviour and non‐terrorist offending varied depending on the comparison group (Objective 3, Risk Factor).

1.5. What do the findings of the review mean?

The findings do not offer support for the mental health‐terrorism hypothesis. Trends in the data, however, may point to higher rates among some terrorist samples than others, and in particular among lone‐actor terrorists.

The synthesis could reflect methodological limitations in the studies included. Many studies rely on the media and court reporting, with researchers wholly reliant on these sources to determine whether or not mental health difficulties are present. This could lead to under‐reporting (where such difficulties are not viewed as relevant to a criminal case for example) and thus deflate estimates reported in papers.

That said, even among those papers that have not relied on open‐source information, the evidence does not conclusively demonstrate that terrorist samples are characterised by higher rates of mental disorders or psychological problems than those expected in the community.

1.6. How up‐to‐date is this review?

The review authors searched for sources in April and May 2022, covering research up to December 2021.

2.1. The problem, condition or issue

In the period 1970–1990 there was extensive debate on the potential link between mental disorder and terrorism (Cooper, 1978; Ferracuti & Bruno, 1981; McCauley & Segal, 1987; Rasch, 1979; Shaw, 1986; Silke, 1998; Smith & Morgan, 1994; Wardlaw, 1982). Commentators proposed that some of those who became involved in terrorism had an underlying mental disorder that was causally linked to their violence propensity, including, for example, a range of personality disorders (Cooper, 1978; Lasch, 1979; Pearce, 1977). However, successive studies failed to support this link (e.g., Elliot & Lockhart, 1980; Ferracuti & Bruno, 1981; Lyons and Harbinson, 1986) leaving many convinced that those involved in groups like the Provisional IRA and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) were no different to the general population in terms of mental health difficulties and were, instead, attracted to terrorism by virtue of a multitude of interacting psychosocial processes (e.g., Crenshaw, 1981; Heskin, 1984; Taylor & Horgan, 2006). The assertion that terrorism was the product of abnormality was ultimately deemed ‘unfair’ to the terrorist and abandoned by researchers and policy makers (e.g., Silke, 1998).

In recent times the debate has re‐emerged, fuelled in part by a more nuanced approach where the focus has been on specific forms of terrorism (e.g., lone actor terrorist or right‐wing terrorism) rather than terrorism in general. For example, those interested in so‐called lone actor violence raised concerns about ‘fundamental errors’ in past research (Corner et al., 2016, p. 561) and presented plausible case formulations linking experiential stressors such as social isolation with mental disorder and violence (e.g., Corner & Gill, 2015). Cohort studies of lone actors emerged that appeared to show high rates of mental disorder, with 37% of Liem and colleagues' sample of European lone actor terrorists having ‘some indication of mental illness’, and 25% being clinically diagnosed with ‘a particular mental disorder’ (Liem et al., 2018, p. 60). Such findings were not limited to lone‐actor terrorism (e.g., Weenink, 2015).

However, those who have looked more closely at this evidence base have acknowledged that the picture emerging is far from clear, with the lack of clarity attributable, in part at least, to methodological limitations in that literature (Gill et al., 2021; Jensen et al., 2020). To some extent these limitations centre on one core problem–the difficulty in determining to what extent, if any, the presence of a mental disorder confers risk of terrorist involvement (as opposed to being associated with increased risk). To credibly conclude that disorder (or, more broadly, psychological problems) can increase the risk of becoming involved in terrorism, we suggest that the existing literature needs to demonstrate that certain criteria are met.

The first criterion relates to the prevalence of disorder among terrorist samples, and is termed here ‘the prevalence problem’. Assessing prevalence of mental disorder among terrorist samples using appropriate comparators sheds light on the magnitude of the relationship (if any) between the risk and outcome. It is an important criterion for determining causality and one of several Bradford‐Hill criteria for causation (Hill, 1965). Reporting and interpretating prevalence rates requires careful consideration of the distinction between point and period prevalence, and use of appropriate comparison groups. If mental disorder confers risk of terrorism, then the prevalence rate amongst terrorist samples should be higher than that expected in the general population (matched on key demographics such as age, gender and geographic location). A prerequisite for making such comparisons is synthesising the prevalence rates of mental disorders, and more broadly psychological problems, in terrorist samples.

The second criterion is that of temporality (see Lucas & McMichael, 2005), another Bradford‐Hill criterion (and termed here ‘the temporality problem’). To demonstrate that mental disorder confers risk of involvement in terrorism, then studies must demonstrate that the disorder emerges before involvement in terrorism. If we cannot demonstrate temporality, then differentiating cause and effect is problematic—disorder could be the consequence of terrorist involvement rather than a cause of involvement. The question that must be asked of the literature, then, is: To what extent do findings in the literature support the assertion that earlier mental disorder confers risk of terrorist involvement later in life?

The third criterion that must be met to infer a causal link exists between mental disorder and terrorism is that of plausibility; offering plausible explanations for just how the disorder (or disorders) confers risk of terrorism involvement (the Bradford‐Hill ‘plausibility problem’). Addressing the plausibility problem is hampered by the heterogenous nature of terrorism (the outcome of interest), controversy around the concept of ‘mental disorder’ (the potential risk factor of interest) and, finally, the complexity of the relationship that may exist between terrorism and mental health difficulties.

A final consideration for those conducting research on terrorism and mental disorder relates to the concept of ‘mental disorder’ itself. To illustrate the difficulty with the concept, it is worth referring to the recent contribution of Bakker (2019). Bakker's thesis, like many other clinical psychologists, is that the concept of ‘mental disorder’ is fundamentally flawed, a ‘medical nosology of diseases’ that does little to aid our understanding of clients or how best to intervene to alleviate their distress (p. 1). What is required, they argue, is a paradigm shift towards a focus on ‘psychological problems’ which Bakker defines as ‘a negative psychological‐level state of affairs’ (p. 10). These psychological problems are transdiagnostic (appear across diagnoses and capture the common difficulties reported by patients) and may or may not require intervention. Bakker's thesis draws attention to two types of mental health difficulties—mental disorders and psychological problems.

The difficulty for the terrorism literature is that it is not always clear what the outcome of interest is, particularly when terms like disorder, mental health difficulties, psychological distress, etc. are used interchangeably. Yet, where a formal diagnosis is not made by a mental health professional, then the presence of a mental disorder cannot be inferred. At best, we can conclude that the individual has or had what Bakker refers to as a psychological problem.

This review seeks to contribute to our understanding of the potential link between terrorism and mental health difficulties by focusing on the problems of prevalence, temporality and plausibility, while being sensitive to the distinction between mental disorder and psychological problems. Specifically, the review will present a synthesis of the evidence on prevalence, temporality and plausibility drawing on the best evidence available. In reviewing prevalence, temporality and plausibility, we are presenting an initial test of what we refer to as the mental health—terrorism hypothesis: That mental health difficulties confer risk of involvement in terrorist behaviour.

2.2. Outcome—Terrorist behaviour

The outcome of interest in this systematic review is terrorist behaviour. While there is no universally accepted definition of terrorist behaviour (Ganor, 2002; Saul, 2019; Silke, 1996), there is at least some consensus that it refers to: (a) an act or campaign of actual or threatened violence that seeks to elicit the terror emotion in a target audience and; (b) with the intention of bringing about change in line with the world‐view of the terrorist (e.g., Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Moghaddam, 2007). Terrorist behaviour intends to cause harm, physical or otherwise (Van Der Does et al., 2021).

One complexity encountered by those conducting research in the area of terrorism is the heterogeneity of the phenomenon itself (Herrington & Roberts, 2012; Monahan, 2012; Roberts & Horgan, 2008). For example, one study of 176 terrorist organisations identified 33 different ideologies as well as diversity in terms of size, organisational structure, geographic location, and lethality (Cook & Lounsbery, 2011). It cannot be assumed that individuals who become involved in different forms of terrorism do so through the same processes (Change Institute, 2008). The implications of this heterogeneity, for the proposed review, are that, when we refer to terrorism, we specify this behaviour in terms of the ‘type’ of terrorism waged.

The review excludes violent radicalisation as an outcome, understood within this study to refer to a process of growing acceptance of the legitimacy of violence to bring about societal change (McCormick, 2003). We justify this exclusion on the following basis:

• 1.

  Violent radicalisation and terrorism are conceptually non‐synonymous. Terrorist behaviour is action orientated whilst violent radicalisation is a process whereby individuals become increasingly committed to the use of violence, yet may not necessarily perpetrate violence (i.e., it can be cognitively orientated) (Sarma, 2017).

• 2.

  Of the significant minority of those who accept the legitimacy of terrorist violence (e.g., PEW, 2013), a small proportion transition into terrorism (Christmann, 2012). Those who transition into terrorism may differ from those who do not on both dispositional (e.g., morality, aptitude, motivation, etc.) or situational (e.g., opportunity) levels. If so, the findings from the literature on violent radicalisation will lack external validity when applied to terrorist behaviour.

2.3. Potential risk factor—Mental health difficulties

The review informs our understanding of the potential link between mental disorder and terrorist involvement. However, we are acutely aware of the limitations of the largely disease‐orientated focus of ‘mental disorders’, and for the reasons set out below extend our focus to include a more transdiagnostic lens by considering, broadly, psychological problems.

The American Psychological Association defines mental disorder as any condition ‘characterized by cognitive and emotional disturbances, abnormal behaviours, impaired functioning, or any combination of these’ (American Psychological Association, 2020). Diagnostic manuals, such as iterations of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and International Classification of Diseases (ICD; World Health Organization WHO, 2019), present diagnostic criteria for a range of mental disorders, and diagnoses can be made based on the combination of symptoms and their severity.

While diagnostic systems convey a sense that mental disorders are discrete psychological experiences, Allsopp and colleagues note that diagnostic systems are characterised by: (a) varying diagnostic rules across presentations; (b) overlap in symptoms across diagnoses and; (c) a tendency for diagnostic labels to mask the root causes of distress and problematic behaviours (Allsopp et al., 2019). They also argue that diagnoses can distract from the real‐world work of reaching an in‐depth understanding of the individual (see also Galatzer‐Levy & Bryant, 2013; Olbert et al., 2014).

The use of diagnostic systems in terrorism research is particularly problematic. Mental disorders can only be said to be present where they have been diagnosed by an appropriately trained mental health professional. The presence of a disorder, as characterised in DSM or ICD, cannot be reliably inferred from reports of symptoms present in open‐source data alone (e.g., press coverage of trials of suspected terrorist offenders). It requires careful assessment by a professional, often in collaboration with the individual being assessed, of the presence or absence of various criteria. Where the results of such assessment are made available for the purposes of research, then we can have at least some confidence in the diagnostic process.

However, the data on terrorist offenders does not always provide access to data gathered through structured clinical assessment by a suitably trained professional. Some of the most widely cited studies in the area, for example, are based on open‐source information derived from the media coverage, etc., of terrorists, and where inferences are made as to the presence/absence of disorder based on difficulties experienced by the terrorist and publicly reported (e.g., Gill et al., 2014). Yet it is not always clear if these difficulties are any different to those experienced in the normal course of one's life.

Bakker (2019) has discussed this in the context of differentiating between ‘psychological problems’ that ‘do not self‐perpetuate… and tend to ease without interventive therapy’ (p.11) and ‘clinical psychological problems’. The former, Bakker argues, are normal adaptive processes that might include an experience of depression after a bereavement, but which follows the normal course of recovery. The latter, however, might take the form of avoidance, be pervasive and enduring, impair one's quality of life, and require intervention to resolve.

In the review we attend to the literature on mental disorder and psychological problems. While our initial intention was to differentiate between psychological problems that are ‘clinical’ (required intervention) and those that were not clearly clinical (no evidence of a requirement of intervention), no papers that met our eligibility criteria made such a distinction. Synthesising the literature on ‘mental disorder’ provides coverage of the diagnostic literature. Attending to the broader literature on psychological problems captures a wider body of literature and means that our review is not constrained by the limitations of the psychiatric model (see ‘Inclusion Criteria’ for additional detail).

2.4. How mental disorder and psychological problems may be linked to terrorist behaviour

The link between mental disorder and forensic risk has been the subject of research for decades. Findings are unclear and inconsistent, with some studies appearing to link disorder to violence risk, while others have reported no link (e.g., Augestad Knudsen, 2020; Bhui & Jones, 2017). There appears to be three core complexities in this area that are directly relevant to an assessment of the link between terrorism and disorder.

The first is to do with the prevalence problem, as discussed earlier in this protocol, and which requires an assessment of the rates of mental disorders, and more broadly psychological problems, in terrorist samples. The second is temporality, initially discussed by Bradford Hill in their consideration of association and causality (i.e., one of the Bradford Hill criteria for causal inferences; see Lucas & McMichael, 2005). To argue that mental disorder confers risk of violence, research must demonstrate that the onset of psychological problems (Factor A) pre‐dates involvement in violence, or at the very least detection for terrorist offences (Factor B). If temporality cannot be established, there is a risk of misinterpreting correlation (where Factor A is associated with Factor B) as causation (Factor A causes Factor B).

For example, high rates of mental disorder are often observed among incarcerated violent offenders (O'Sullivan et al., 2018). A typical study examining the link between mental disorder and violent offending in this population will involve those incarcerated completing a battery of measures that assess psychological wellbeing and severity of offence (‘index offence’). Where a relationship emerges, the temptation is to conclude that higher levels of psychological distress confer risk of serious offending (Factor A causes Factor B). The problem here, however, is that the research design deployed cannot test causal relationships and is limited to measuring associations. Because we do not have longitudinal data showing levels of psychological symptoms before involvement in violence, we cannot exclude the possibility that the distress arose due to the index offence, or during incarceration for that offence. In such a case, incarceration/offending (Factor B) could cause distress (Factor A). This resonates with the conceptual difficulties surrounding the suggestion that pre‐existing Post‐traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) increases risk of terrorist involvement among so‐called ‘foreign fighters’ and where PTSD is assessed after they have returned from conflict (e.g., Al‐Attar, 2019).

Even where temporality is determined, we also need to consider the ‘Third Variable Problem’. Here an apparent causal relationship between disorder and violence may be explained by a lurking third variable (Variable X) that influences both factors and causes them to co‐vary. This might arise, for example, where experiences of discrimination and isolation drive both mental disorder and violent radicalisation. Here the apparent relationship between mental disorder and violent radicalisation may be wholly attributable to situational stressors and intervening to manage disorder may not reduce risk.

In reality, there is unlikely to be a large body of scientifically robust longitudinal evidence that addresses both temporality and the ‘Third Variable Problem’. This is particularly the case in the area of terrorism studies where the problem of concern is so difficult to expose to academic enquiry due to its low base rate in the population (Sarma, 2017). In such a situation, another of Hill's criteria becomes important—that of plausibility. That is, in assessing the relationship between mental disorder and violence risk, we must be able to present a plausible theoretical argument as to just how disorder confers risk. In clinical forensic practice, plausibility is addressed through careful assessment of forensic risk and the presenting of a theoretical argument (or formulation) that explains how the presence of risk factors may confer risk (Davies et al., 2013).

One way of presenting a formulation of risk is through the ‘4Ps’ Framework. The 4Ps Framework places a risk factor in a temporal space or chronology and proposes the nature of the relationship between the factor, other factors, and the outcome of interest. In doing so it differentiates between predisposing, precipitating, protective and perpetuating factors. It is widely used in both clinical and forensic psychology case formulation (e.g., Macneil et al., 2012).

The 4Ps framework can encourage a more nuanced consideration of the link(s) between terrorism and mental disorder. A predisposing risk factor is one that places the individual at risk of becoming involved in terrorism later in life. In the broader literature on clinical and clinical forensic psychology mental disorder is viewed as primarily a non‐causative background predisposition for becoming involved in violent behaviour and which is part of a complex set of interacting risk factors that together lead to a scaffolding of risk (e.g., Van Dorn et al., 2012). For example, Markowitz (2011) adopts a Social Disorganisation Theory approach to formulating risk in proposing that people with long‐term mental disorders are more likely to reside in disadvantaged communities characterised by socially disorganised neighbourhoods with a lack of health care, limited job opportunities, racial diversity and fragmented families. Crime flourishes in such criminogenic contexts, they argue, because there is a culture of acceptance of violent crime and poor social control over offending. This resonates with the terrorism literature, with some arguing that vulnerability to violent radicalisation is due, in part, to radicalising settings where some sections of the community endorse beliefs that justify terrorism (e.g., Schils & Pauwels, 2016).

A precipitating risk factor is one that apparently triggers a ‘crisis’. In the mental health literature, extreme situational stressors such as relationship break‐down, bereavement or other acute trauma can result in a cascade of events leading to the negative outcome (e.g., Barber et al., 2014). For mental disorder to precipitate involvement in terrorism, research would need to demonstrate that involvement in terrorism was immediately preceded by the onset of an episode of psychological distress that causally led to involvement in violence. In the broader clinical forensic literature, this has typically been associated with the presence of ‘positive’ psychotic symptoms, such as irrational (delusional) beliefs about others who subsequently become the target of violent intent (Markowitz, 2011). Of course, it could be reasonably argued that in some cases where terrorist behaviour is precipitated by a mental disorder, and derives from disorder (e.g., persecutory beliefs), that the issue of concern is clinical forensic risk rather than terrorism.

Some forms of mental disorder may actually preclude an individual from becoming involved in terrorism (i.e., it is a ‘protective factor’). For example, there is evidence that organisations like the Provisional IRA sought to recruit the most psychologically robust individuals into their ranks as a way of reducing the potential for members to be compromised and turn informer, or to provide information while being questioned by the police and security services (Sarma, 2005). Here mental disorder actually protects against involvement.

Finally, perpetuating factors, in the context of terrorism, serve to maintain the problematic behaviour, and thus hamper the ability of the individual to disengage from terrorism. In their review of push and pull factors that influence the ability of extremists to disengage from terrorism, Jensen and colleagues (2020) noted that increased social mobility, onset of new intimate romantic relationships, children, and access to rehabilitation services can support disengagement. Conversely, mental health difficulties can impede the ability of individuals to develop relationships, access services, and be more socially mobile, hampering disengagement. They conclude that ‘[e]specially when co‐occurring with substance abuse, mental illness can act as a strong barrier to disengagement, especially if it counteracts the feelings of disillusionment that otherwise may prompt one's exit’ (Jensen et al., 2020, p. 8).

2.5. Why it is important to do the review

As noted earlier, findings in the literature examining the link between terrorism and mental disorder are inconsistent (Ho et al., 2019). Where such inconsistencies are a feature of an evidence base, the cherry‐picking of results to suit a specific position can impede a nuanced understanding. Systematic reviews provide a synthesis of the available literature in one accessible paper and in doing so reduce bias (White & Waddington, 2012).

Gill and colleagues (2021) provide a valuable review of the literature exploring the link between mental disorder and terrorism. They note the heterogeneity in prevalence rates in the literature and provide some plausible explanations for this heterogeneity. Our review, however, we will attend in particular to point and period prevalence rates and include studies published since 2020. We will also present comprehensive data syntheses for both mental disorder and psychological problems and where appropriate present sub‐group analyses. Moreover, we will critically evaluate the appropriateness of the comparator populations being used as benchmarks for prevalence. This can help us more carefully consider the causal link, if any, between disorder/difficulties and terrorist behaviour.

We also considered Misiak et al. (2019) systematic review of the link between mental health and radicalisation and mass violence. While the review also presents a valuable contribution to the literature, it focuses primarily on the risk of radicalisation, with nine of the 12 studies included in their review using community samples and self‐reported radical beliefs (i.e., not terrorist samples). As noted above, we cannot assume that the literature on violent radical beliefs is valid for our understanding of terrorist behaviour.

Findings from the current systematic review will support a more informed debate on the link between mental health difficulties and terrorist behaviour. For each paper included in the review, we isolate and specify the prevalence being reported (e.g., present at time of assessment (point); childhood etc.). We will synthesise studies that are sensitive to temporal sequencing (temporality), where difficulties are onset before involvement in terrorism, and studies that examine the extent to which difficulties are associated with involvement (i.e., compare rates across two groups).

Apart from supporting debate in the area, the findings will be of value to a range of professionals who are responsible for risk assessment, risk mitigation and psychological intervention. In relation to risk assessment, for example, two popular risk assessment tools, the VERA 2R (Pressman et al., 2016) and ERG 22+ (Lloyd & Dean, 2015), both contain items relating to psychopathology despite concerns that (a) the evidence supporting their inclusion is contested and (b) there is a need to disaggregate disorders into various forms or problem clusters to determine which, if any, may be linked to risk of terrorist behaviour (see Herzog‐Evans, 2018). In supporting a more nuanced understanding of the link between disorder, psychological problems and terrorist behaviour our review will help guide the use of such tools and in doing so support decision making around psychological support, appropriate detention settings, and release from detention.

In relation to psychological intervention, there are multi‐disciplinary teams working in most countries tasked with supporting individuals who may at risk of transitioning into terrorism to redirect their lives towards non‐violence. In many cases these teams include health workers who are sensitive to psychological problems that are believed to exacerbate risk of becoming involved in terrorism—teams comprised of professionals who would benefit from a systematic review of the relevant literature. The work of such teams has been reviewed and discussed elsewhere (see Sarma, 2018, 2019a, 2019b).

4.1. Criteria for considering studies for this review

4.2. Search methods for identification of studies

Our search strategy aligned with Cochrane Training and our past reviews for both the Cochrane Collaboration (Doody et al., 2019) and the Campbell Collaboration (Carthy et al., 2020). It was also informed by Kugley et al. (2017) guidance on information retrieval for Campbell systematic reviews.

4.3. Data collection and analysis

4.4. Deviations from the protocol

There were three deviations from the protocol. First, in our protocol we stressed the importance of distinguishing between point and period prevalence, and different points and periods, when reporting and pooling prevalence rates. For example, we envisaged that studies would report life‐time, 12‐ and 24‐month prevalence rates (i.e., different periods) and at different points (i.e., right now vs. at time of engagement vs. at time of disengagement, etc.). However, of those studies reporting period prevalence, all focused on life‐time prevalence rates of mental health difficulties. For point prevalence, eligible studies focused on difficulties present at the time of an attack (‘detection’), while being processed through the courts, or while incarcerated. Thus, the review reports on a more restricted set of points and periods than initially envisaged in the protocol.

Second, Objective 2 deals with temporal sequencing and we had initially envisaged isolating studies that reported on rates of difficulties that were onset before the involvement in terrorist behaviour. Such evidence, we stressed, places the hypothesised risk factor in the correct temporal sequence to the outcome and provided a purer test of the mental health‐terrorism hypothesis. However, studies that dealt with temporal sequencing, with one exception, focused on the presence of difficulties before detection rather than involvement—the limitation being that it is possible that such difficulties were onset between the point of engagement and their detection. The exception is Corner and Gill (2020), with Corner providing the authors with data on mental health difficulties before engagement.

Third, we had anticipated differentiating between diagnosed disorders and psychological problems. However, when we extracted the data, it became clear that studies had adopted a number of different approaches to coding for diagnosed disorders and which set more or less stringent thresholds for assessment and diagnosis. To be sensitive to this we differentiate between ‘diagnosed disorders’, ‘suspected disorders’ and ‘psychological problems’ as follows:

• 1.

  If a study referred to mental disorder or mental illness and where all individuals in the sample have a ‘confirmed diagnosis’, ‘clinical diagnosis’, ‘formal diagnosis’, or diagnosis made by a trained professional (or within a mental health report), then it was coded as relating to ‘mental disorder’. As examples, Bubolz and Simi (2019) refer to mental disorder as being present where ‘a medical practitioner had ever diagnosed the person’ (p. 6), Capellan (2015) refers to ‘formal’ and ‘confirmed diagnosis’ (p. 400) and Corner and Gill (2021) required an ‘official psychiatric consultation or diagnosis’ (p. 705).

• 2.

  If a study referred to mental disorder or mental illness but individuals (or a proportion of the individuals) but a formal diagnosis was not required, or where a diagnosis is suspected based on reported symptoms and the alignment of these symptoms with DSM or ICD criteria, then it was coded as relating to ‘suspected mental disorder’. For example, some studies referred to disorders being present when either (a) there was a formal clinical diagnosis or (b) publicly available information suggested that they met the criteria for a mental disorder but as assessed based on that information only. For example, Corner and Gill (2019) relied on open‐sources when classifying their sample as having a mental disorder. Disorder was present where there was an official diagnosis, but also where researchers formed the opinion that reported symptoms aligned with DSM/ICD criteria.

• 3.

  Finally, where studies referred to disorder but where there was no confirmed diagnosis, or no reference to diagnostic systems, the studies were coded as psychological problems. Some studies explicitly sought to explore psychological difficulties, distress, disturbance, etc., rather than disorder, and such studies were also clustered as reporting psychological problems. Capellan and Anisin (2018), for example, coded individuals as having a mental disorder when there was a confirmed diagnosis, or based on ‘characteristics by family members and close friends [that suggest] mental disturbance’ (p. 244).

Table 5 sets out our interpretation of the nature of the mental health difficulties being reported in each paper, with an accompanying justification.

5.1. Description of studies

Figure 1 (PRISMA flowchart) presents the results of our search, screening and identification process for all review objectives. The systematic search of electronic databases identified 196,888 records, unrestricted by publication date. After de‐duplication, 109,027 records were progressed to title/abstract screening in DistillerSR. An initial stage of de‐duplication was conducted in EndNote, followed by another stage of de‐duplication using the Detect Duplicates function in DistillerSR (which can identify additional duplicates compared to EndNote). A total of 108,763 records were excluded at this stage as duplicates, ineligible types (e.g., book reviews), or because they were not about terrorism and mental disorder, leaving 264 records for full‐text review.

The full‐texts of all records were obtained and screened in DistillerSR. These were combined with full‐texts of records harvested from past reviews, the grey literature, hand searches of journals, forward citation searching, and consultation with expert groups (n = 32). Of the 296 documents, the full text of 14 could not be sourced and are listed in the ‘Studies awaiting classification’ reference section. The remaining full texts were reviewed, with two excluded due to being duplicates of other studies. Others were ineligible as they were not published in English (n = 12), were not focused on terrorist behaviour (n = 33), were not empirical studies (n = 69), did not include a measure of mental health (n = 8), or did not measure mental health in a terrorist sample (n = 102). This left 56 papers reporting on 73 terrorist samples (studies). For clarity, henceforth we use the term ‘paper’ to refer to the original full‐text record and ‘study’ to refer to each unique terrorist sample isolated.

All 56 papers, reporting 73 studies, were included in Objective 1 (Prevalence), though not all were included in the data syntheses reported due to overlapping datasets. Of these, 9 papers (10 studies) reported prevalence rates where the difficulties were onset before either terrorist involvement or the index offence and were eligible for Objective 2 (Temporality). Finally, 9 papers were eligible for synthesis under Objective 3 as they examined the association between mental health difficulties and terrorist behaviour (i.e., comparing terrorists and non‐terrorists). In the remainder of this section, we deal with each objective in turn.

5.2. Objective 1—Prevalence

5.3. Objective 2—Temporality

5.4. Objective 3—Mental health difficulties as a risk factor for terrorism

6.1. Summary of main findings

The link, if any, between mental health difficulties and terrorist behaviour has perplexed researchers, policy makers and practitioners for several decades. Anecdotal evidence from end‐users would suggest that mental health difficulties do present among those who become involved in terrorism, as well as those classified as ‘at risk’ of becoming involved. This has led to the establishment of multidisciplinary teams comprised of law enforcement and health workers, with the latter expected to consider the psychological vulnerabilities of those being assessed and offer the appropriate supports (see Sarma, 2018, 2019a, 2019b). This is done with the dual intention of alleviating distress and protecting society.

Yet, across the empirical literature, evidence on the link between terrorism and mental health difficulties has been inconsistent and, at times, conflicting. This review has presented a synthesis of the body of empirical literature that has reported prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples (Objectives 1 and 2) and compared these rates with rates in non‐terrorist samples (Objective 3).

For Objective 1 we isolated studies reporting life‐time rates of diagnosed mental disorder, suspected disorder, and psychological problems in separate analyses. In doing so, we anticipated that we would see marked increase in rates from reported problems to suspected disorder and diagnosed disorder (we expected diagnosed and suspected disorders to be less prevalent than psychological problems). We did see such a trend, through it was less marked than anticipated.

Of the 18 studies that reported on life‐time prevalence rates of mental disorder, the pooled prevalence was 17.4% (95% CI = 11.1%–26.3%), with an increase to 23.2% (95% CI = 13.8%–36.4%) for the eight studies that reported life‐time rates of suspected disorder, and 28.5% (95% CI = 21.0%–37.5%) for the 21 studies reporting psychological problems. When we collapsed all studies reporting problems, disorder and suspected disorder into one analysis, the pooled prevalence rate for the 37 studies included was 25.5% (95% CI = 20.2%–31.6%). At the upper‐end, then, our pooled estimate of life‐time prevalence rate of mental health difficulties (Objective 1) was 28.5%.

We anticipated that isolating studies that reported prevalence rates of difficulties that emerged before involvement in terrorism would be sensitive to temporal sequencing and thus complement our test our review (Objective 2). However, the studies captured typically focused on the point of detection/arrest in temporal sequencing rather than the point of involvement. As we cannot rule out the possibility that some individuals develop mental health difficulties between the point of engagement and point of detection, our analysis is less sensitive to temporal sequencing that we had intended. Our estimates here, based on a relatively small number of studies, were 30% (k = 5, 95% CI = 17.7%–45.9%) and 27.8% (k = 9, 95% CI = 20.9%–35.9%), respectively.

In our protocol, we had envisaged adopting a range of benchmarks for disorder and problems for different jurisdictions. However, given that the range of estimates reported here are lower than anticipated, we consider it sufficient to note the following: In Steel and colleagues' meta‐analysis (2014) of lifetime prevalence rates of mental disorder among 16‐65 year olds globally, and where included studies applied a structured psychiatric diagnostic interview, they concluded that 29.2% (95% CI = 25.9%–32.6%) of people experience a mental disorder at some point in their lives. That sample was based on a pooled sample of 452,595 individuals from 82 countries. We also note that Winning et al. (2015) longitudinal study of psychological problems (distress) in adults from the 1958 British Birth Cohort Study reported that 50.7% of their sample of 6,714 were distressed at some point in their lives.

In our analysis for Objective 1 we exceeded Steel et al.'s (2014) estimate only twice. Studies that reported rates based on closed sources or interviews with terrorists reported a life‐time prevalence rate of 39.1% (95% CI = 28.9%–50.4%), though this was for any mental health difficulty (including psychological problems). Similarly, studies that reported rates for lone actor terrorists reported a life‐time prevalence rate of 36.1% (95% CI = 29.1%–43.7%), again based on any mental health difficulties. In both moderator analysis, however, the inclusion of diagnosed disorder, suspected disorder and psychological problems in the prevalence rates sets a less conservative threshold for mental health difficulties than that of Steel et al., where a confirmed psychiatric diagnosis (determined through psychiatric interview) was required.

We could also refer to other estimates, including an estimate by Carlson and colleagues (2019) which specifically estimated the current rate (i.e., point‐prevalence at any point in time) in conflict‐affected populations at 22.1%. This finding is relevant as it demonstrates that the point‐prevalence rates of mental disorder or suspected disorder identified in our review (14.4%, 95% CI = 4.8%–35.7%) is no greater than we would anticipate in the general population.

We also conducted a summary of single effects for the studies that compared terrorist samples with other samples (Objective 3). In our synthesis of five studies reporting life‐time prevalence rates of mental health difficulties, the studies trended towards terrorist samples being broadly comparable to their respective, comparison group. Two studies (Bronsard et al., 2022; Dhumad et al., 2020) provided data comparing point‐prevalence (current) rates of disorder between terrorist and non‐terrorist samples, with results from each study suggesting that the odds of the terrorist samples having a disorder was lower than that of non‐terrorist offenders. One study compared a terrorist sample with a community sample (Dhumad et al., 2020). In that study, the terrorist sample had a greater odds of having had a conduct disorder in childhood but were there was no difference in the odds of meeting the diagnostic criteria for ASPD.

In summary, our findings in relation to prevalence rates of mental health difficulties (Objective 1 and Objective 2) have provided unremarkable pooled estimates for terrorist populations as a whole, with some evidence that lone actor terrorists have higher rates of difficulties that other terrorist populations in line with earlier research (Corner & Gill, 2015; Gruenewald et al., 2013; Liem et al., 2018). It is not clear, however, whether these rates, which relate to any mental health difficulty, exceed those expected in the general population. It is important to note that the dearth of studies drawing from comparative general populations is a major limitation in the literature as a whole. Studies comparing terrorist samples with other samples have relied primarily on serious criminals as a comparison group and, perhaps unsurprisingly, do not provide evidence that mental health difficulties are associated with terrorist involvement.

At the outset of this review, we referred to the Bradford‐Hill criteria for determining causation. We viewed these criteria as important in the context of terrorism research because they point to the kinds of evidence that one would expect to see if there was a causal link between the risk and the outcome, even in the absence of prospective longitudinal case‐control studies. Here we suggested that if there was a causal link between mental health difficulties and terrorism, then we could reasonably expect to see higher prevalence rates of difficulties in terrorist samples than the general population or a comparison group (prevalence), and that this would be particularly marked where studies were sensitive to temporal sequencing (temporality). The evidence from this review did not support either criterion. As discussed further below, this may reflect the methodological limitations of the body of evidence and the narrow scope of the review.

The review was also interested in the Bradford‐Hill criterion of plausibility – that there should be a strong theoretical link between the risk and outcome. We considered this as part of our Risk of Bias assessment. In general, there is a sense of convergence in the literature included in the review where authors are arguing that the link between mental health and terrorism is (a) complex, (b) indirect and involving interaction with other psychosocial experiences and (c) highly individualised (e.g., Corner et al., 2019). At most mental health difficulties present a background non‐determinative predisposing factor nested among other factors and that may present a vulnerability to terrorism through the depletion of resilience, impairment of judgement, restriction of opportunity, and an almost unlimited range of other life experiences and situational factors. Such complexity is not uniquely a feature of trajectories into terrorism—it characterises almost all forms of serious offending where no single risk factor or process is determinative.

Bubolz and Simi (2019) illustrate this approach to formulation in their examination of mental health problems among former members of white supremacist groups, suggesting that these psychological problems may be rooted in traumatic experiences, often during childhood and adolescence and compounded by experiences of rejection in adulthood. Ultimately this may create a susceptibility to being drawn into extremist groups. Jensen and Kane (2021) reach a similar conclusion based on their research with QAnon followers as do Cherney and colleagues (2022) following their analysis of young people who radicalised to violence in Australia. They suggest that background predisposing factors like mental health difficulties and ‘deviant conduct’ interact with exposure to radicalising content and networks to ‘set up a potential pathway to violent extremism’ (p. 112). Others observed interactions between mental health difficulties and past non‐terrorist criminality (Thijssen et al., 2021), exposure to military‐related trauma (Haugstvedt & Koehler, 2021) and grievances such as poverty and oppression (Candilis et al., 2021).

With one exception, studies included in the review didn't propose that mental health difficulties precipitated terrorist involvement. Clemmow et al. (2020) do appear to allude to such a process however. They viewed lone actor terrorism as heterogeneous and develop a typology of lone‐actor violence based on person‐exposure patterns. Of four types that they isolate, one is labelled ‘susceptible’ and, according to the authors, may radicalise quickly due to high impulsivity and psychiatric disorder which presents a ‘core cognitive susceptibility to environmental influence’ (p. 468).

The possibility that mental health difficulties are protective against terrorist involvement was also considered in the studies, with most echoing what King et al. (2018) refer to as a selection effect, whereby terrorist organisations prefer recruits who can be trusted, are reliable and can take direction. This said, Bubolz and Simi (2019) found that white supremacist organisations are open to individuals with mental health problems and, in contrast with other forms of terrorism, ‘may actually prefer’ (p. 10) to recruit such individuals (p. 19).

In summary, the findings across our three review objectives converge with the theoretical positions set out in the papers. We don't see indications/tentative evidence of a causal relationship between mental health difficulties and risk of engagement in the pooled prevalence rates. Instead, our authors are arguing for more nuanced ways of thinking about the role mental health may play in the lives of those who may be at risk of involvement in terrorism.

6.2. Overall completeness and applicability of the evidence

We searched a broad range of platforms and databases, unrestricted by year of publication. Anticipating that some studies reporting relevant data would not have mental health as a primary focus, and thus may not refer to mental health in the title or abstract, we also completed an extensive supplementary search of the grey literature, contacting leading authors and expert networks, by hand searching specialist journals and by harvesting records from included studies. We believe that we have captured the bulk of studies that meet our eligibility criteria.

Clarification or additional data was requested from corresponding authors representing more than half of all included studies. This aided our decision making with regard to prioritising and excluding non‐independent studies (overlapping data set). It also helped us determine how authors managed missing data and allowed us to standardised our approach to calculating effect sizes (i.e., by counting positive cases as the numerator and all cases as the denominator).

Despite these strengths, we would acknowledge that our review had a number of limitations which hampers its applicability. In particular, we expect that there are additional, unpublished and published studies that we have not captured in our search, and acknowledge that the exclusion of studies not published in English undermines the overall completeness of the review. We also acknowledge that our review was narrow in scope and that there are other sources of evidence, including qualitative studies, that offer an equally valuable, and complementary, lens through which to explore the role of mental health difficulties in terrorism.

6.3. Quality of the evidence

Notwithstanding the barriers to conducting research with terrorist samples, and the high threshold set by the JBI checklists deployed in our risk of bias assessment, there were a number of limitations in the body of evidence included. We highlight three here. First, the majority of studies included were based on open‐source datasets that are almost entirely reliant on media and court reporting. While such datasets are valuable for dealing with many research questions, we would question to what extent open sources accurately capture the presence and absence of mental health difficulties and, by extension, the validity of interpretations of disorder or clinical psychological problems by researchers or clinicians based on such data.

Bakker (2006) captures the limitation of open sources well, reporting that ‘it is impossible to gather complete information from open sources for all variables… This means that our generalisations sometimes required some crude judgement on our part’ (p. 43). Others have been more vocal in their concerns, with Brym and Araj (2012) referring to researchers making inferences as to the characteristics of terrorists based on ‘scraps of biographical evidence pasted together from newspaper reports and other published sources’ (p. 433) and Kupper and Meloy (2021) acknowledging that their own source of data (manifestos) offered ‘very limited ability’ to identify the presence or absence of mental health difficulties (p. 14). Conversely, whilst acknowledging the limitations of open sources in terrorism research, Clemmow and colleagues (2020) note that systematic approaches to trawling open sources, extracting data and coding that data can mitigate against some concerns. Similar defences have been mounted by others (e.g., Cherney et al., 2022), and we see evidence of this rigour in most of the studies included in this review. The detailed accounts of the processes used to build the datasets in the eligible studies would suggest a more systematic process than suggested by Brym and Araj.

Some have argued that one way of overcoming this limitation is through in‐depth research with the terrorists themselves (e.g., Bubolz & Simi, 2019), an approach adopted by a number of studies included in this review. However, even here there have been concerns about the reliability of data based on retrospective recall of life experiences (Simi et al., 2016).

A second limitation of the evidence base is uncertainty as to the representativeness of the samples recruited, with many of the authors of the papers included here acknowledging that their findings may not generalise to other groups within their jurisdictions or apparently similar forms of terrorism in other parts of the world (e.g., Candilis et al., 2021; Pfundmair et al., 2022).

Third, few studies considered specific diagnoses and links to terrorism risk (for exceptions see Bronsard et al., 2022; Thijssen et al., 2021). The potential value of doing so is illustrated by Thijssen et al.'s (2021) study with incarcerated terrorist offenders. Having reported rates of diagnosed disorders that are in‐line with that expected in the general population, they then noted that rates of schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) were higher than expected. With regard to ASD, they suggest that individuals with ASD may have social and communication deficits and be detail‐orientated, both of which may attract them to on‐line environments and extremist content.

Fourth, we believe it is important to highlight the two different approaches to treating missing values adopted in the studies included and the consequences for reported effect sizes. Some papers based prevalence estimates for mental health difficulties based on positive cases against all cases for which the mental health status was known (i.e., confirmed positive or negative cases, but excluding unknown cases, and sometimes referred to as ‘valid precent’). Others reported rates based on positive cases against all cases. Our synthesis of all studies was based on the latter approach.

To illustrate the consequence of these divergent approaches it is worth considering LaFree and colleagues (2018) study of 1473 extremists in the US and based on open‐source data (where significant levels of missing values for mental health difficulties might be expected). Researchers were instructed to code disorder as a missing value if there was no reference to mental disorder in the sources. In their main analysis they report that this left them with 284 individuals for whom they had data, and 43% of whom had a mental illness. However, elsewhere they note that if they include all cases in the denominator, then the ‘effective rate of mental illness in the data set drops to 8.4%, which is comparable to rates of mental illness in the general population’ (p. 246).

Divergent approaches to managing missing data is not in itself an issue of quality (just reporting standards). What would improve the quality of the data, however, is consistent analysis of missing values to assess bias. Few studies included in the review presented such an analysis, though there are notable exceptions (e.g., Bronsard et al., 2022).

6.4. Potential biases in the review process

Our exclusion of studies that were not published in English (e.g., Alberda et al., 2018) introduces a potential source of bias in the review. It is hard to predict what effect this exclusion may have had on our synthesis. One review of 50 meta‐analyses concluded that when non‐English language papers were included in those reviews the estimates reported in the meta‐analyses changed, but in inconsistent directions (Neimann Rasmussen & Montgomery, 2018). In five studies, the estimates became more positive and, in 16, the estimates became less positive. While acknowledging that there can be significant resource requirements to running searchers in multiple languages (and screen and extract (reliably) data from those records), the authors concluded that ‘non‐English studies are important to include to avoid bias in reviews’ (p. 4).

Second, we did not screen titles and abstracts in duplicate which has been found to introduce biases. Waffenschmidt et al. (2019) presented a synthesis of papers that compared the reliability of single versus conventional double screening in systematic reviews. They noted that even among experienced reviewers, the median proportion of missed records was 3% when not screened in duplicate. In the current review, the collective experience of the reviewers, as well as time constraints associated with the large number of records returned from our search, informed our decision not to screen the titles and subtracts in duplicate. SC and KC are experienced reviewers with content expertise. They have screened for Campbell Collaboration and Cochrane reviews in the past, including one review in the area of terrorism where they screened together (Carthy et al., 2020). SC has a PhD in the area of psychology and terrorism and KC is a forensic psychologist who has co‐authored reports with KS on the link between mental disorder and terrorism.

Third, two key decisions made by the research team shaped the review and analyses. First, we selected studies that met our conceptualization of terrorism. In the main this was uncomplicated, as the samples recruited engaged in behaviours that could be broadly considered as terrorism. However, this was not always the case. For example, we included Jensen and Kane's (2021) QAnon sample in our review. The sample is a sub‐sample (n = 51) of QAnon followers and excludes those involved in the Capital Hill riots on January 6th, 2021. The QAnon movement is viewed as an emerging and evolving threat by the US authorities who have expressed concern that more followers will move from radical on‐line behaviour (‘digital soldiers’) to violence. However, some have cautioned that most followers pose little threat of violence and that researchers run the risk of exaggerating the threat they pose by conflating radical thought and radical action (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2021). Others may have excluded this sample. In this case, we sought to be inclusive and selected the study as being eligible for our review.

Fourth, we classified studies as reporting on mental disorder, suspected disorder and psychological problems. We have sought to make this process rigorous and transparent in our reporting but recognise that we could have set more stringent requirements in classifying a study as reporting on diagnosed disorder by requiring a confirmed clinical assessment. We could also have set a less stringent requirement by not disaggregating those with diagnoses and suspected diagnoses. Others may have approached this differently.

Finally, we acknowledge the importance of moving beyond data based on general terrorist samples towards a more nuanced assessment of rates of mental health difficulties across different forms of terrorism. In our disaggregation of forms of terrorism in our data synthesis, we compared studies that reported on lone‐actor terrorist samples with studies reporting on all other terrorist samples. However, as the literature base builds, future syntheses will be in a position to disaggregate the analyses further and, thus, consider rates of mental health difficulties across different forms of terrorism (e.g., Jihadi vs. lone actor vs. right‐wing vs. separatist, etc.).

6.5. Disagreements or agreements with other studies or reviews

Our conclusion that the evidence reporting period and point prevalence of mental health difficulties does not support the mental health—terrorism hypothesis is in‐line with much of the literature. Our estimates differ from an earlier review, but not remarkably so. Gill et al. (2021) completed a review and meta‐analysis of 19 studies that reported rates of mental disorder in terrorist samples. They reported a pooled prevalence rate of confirmed diagnosis of 14.4%, with higher rates for studies using closed data (16.96%) than those using open sources (9.82%). They also noted that studies comparing lone actors with other terrorist samples reported higher rates in the former than the latter. They conclude that a) the evidence does not support the presence of e a unique profile of psychopathological traits that may leave an individual vulnerable to radicalisation but b) lone‐ and group‐terrorists may appear to be two distinct groups of people in terms of their drivers and criminogenic needs.

Our review reports higher rates of mental disorder than reported in Gill and colleagues' (2021) synthesis and observes the same trend with regards of lone actors compared to other forms of terrorism. The higher rates reported here may reflect a more inclusive approach where we permitted terms like ‘confirmed diagnosis’, and reference to ‘disorder’ and diagnostic criteria as evidence that authors were counting medically diagnosed disorders.

6.6. Authors' conclusions

Based on our synthesis of this evidence base, the review does not lend support to the assertion that terrorist samples are characterised by higher rates of mental health difficulties than that observed in the general population. Accepting that there are methodological limitations in the studies extracted, the pooled life‐time prevalence estimate for mental disorder is close to the prevalence rate seen in the general population and the confidence intervals of that estimate are within the range expected for the general population. The exception may be lone actor terrorism, where rates were significantly higher than all other forms of terrorism combined. However, even here the rates are broadly in line with what is expected in the general population.

Findings and conclusions are tentative, reflecting limitations in the body of evidence. We do not discount the possibility that as more evidence emerges our understanding in the area will evolve and conclusions may change. We accept that regardless of findings deriving from group‐based statistics, mental health problems may emerge as relevant in an individual case when that individual is understood in context, as part of a broader psychosocial picture. This is in line with current thinking in the area (e.g., Thijssen et al., 2021).

6.7. Implications for policy and practice

In considering the implications of our review findings for policy and practice we are acutely aware of the narrow focus of our review, and issues with the reliability and validity of the body of evidence as a whole. We also acknowledge that in restricting the review to prevalence and case control studies we have taken just one of many lenses that could be used to consider the mental health—terrorism hypothesis, and that there is equally important social scientific literature that adopts qualitative approaches. These too provide valuable context and insights in the area. Against the backdrop of these limitations, we tentatively suggest that following implications of our findings.

The first implication relates to the focus of the debate around mental health and terrorism among policy, practice and research stakeholders, and which seems to all‐too‐frequently view mental health difficulties as a causal risk factor for violence and assume that if we could only deal with these mental difficulties we would see a reduction in risk. This case is not supported in the evidence reviewed here because there is little evidence from prevalence studies that mental health problems are more prevalent in terrorist samples than in the general community (terrorism in all its forms, as opposed to specific forms of terrorism). We note the emerging consensus that mental health difficulties are one of many indirect non‐causal predisposing risk factors for terrorist involvement just as such difficulties are a background predisposing risk factor for a whole host of other negative outcomes in life including delinquent and offending behaviour (e.g., Malvaso et al., 2016), interpersonal violence (Coid et al., 2021) and cardiovascular disease (Suls & Bunde, 2005).

There may be exceptions for specific forms of terrorism including lone actors, or specific sub‐types of lone actors. This points to the importance of disaggregating terrorism into more granular sub‐types and continuing to seek out any evidence that mental health difficulties play a more direct or determinative role in specific forms of terrorism (e.g. Gill & Corner, 2017). Until such a case is made, however, we should neither assume that a more direct link exists nor discount that it may.

If it is accepted that the best evidence points towards mental health difficulties as a being an indirect background predisposing risk factor for terrorism involvement, then there are some obvious implications for both risk assessment of those believed to be at risk of terrorism involvement/recidivism and for broader preventative measures. Mental health should remain a focus of risk assessment. However, the focus should not be just on a possible direct link between a mental disorder and violence propensity (not supported by the evidence reviewed here), but also the implications of such difficulties for management and supervision (e.g. engagement and compliance with interventions to reduce risk), homelessness, social isolation, personal support, stress and coping, employment and a host of other difficulties that are associated with psychological problems and also offending behaviour. This observation resonates with the conclusions reached by authors of the studies included here who argue in favour of non‐causal links between mental health and terrorism (e.g., Bubolz & Simi, 2019; Jensen & Kane, 2021). It also resonates with the broader practice of forensic risk assessment, and central to popular risk assessment systems including the HRC‐20 (Douglas et al., 2013).

That rates of mental health difficulties are in line with those in the general population suggests that there is value in considering public health primary prevention approaches to countering terrorism which has been recommended by others (e.g., Bhui & Jones, 2017). Here the focus is upstream of the problem of concern, where resources are invested in communities to bolster resilience and access to healthcare etc., to reduce rates of psychological problems or ability to cope with problems and with the potential consequence that communities become resilient to crime in all its forms.

6.8. Implications for research

Despite a relatively large and growing literature on terrorism and mental disorder, it remains an area of research that is difficult to expose to academic enquiry. The barriers to conducting this type of research are many and varied. Indeed, the limitations identified in the evidence‐based are predominantly born out of these challenges, rather than any oversight on the part of researchers. This said, the review has highlighted a number of key limitations in the literature on terrorism and mental disorder that can serve to either, (a) enhance our ability to critical evaluate research findings or (b) improve the way we do research in the first place. These follow from the conclusions of our Risk of Bias assessment and discussion of the quality of the evidence encountered during this review.

First, databases constructed from open sources such as media reports and court reports, present a readily available source of potentially rich data on the characteristics of terrorists and their behaviours. However, the value of open sources in terms of classifying cases as either ‘having’ or ‘not having’ a diagnosis of a mental disorder is entirely contingent on such information being made open‐source in the first place, as well as its accuracy. There is a need to complement studies using such databases (which represented the majority of our studies), with studies that use alternative sources of data. These alternatives will also have strengths and limitations, but collectively the findings from studies incorporating different methodologies allow us to measure the phenomenon through different tools, thus having more confidence in their generalisability.

Second, there is a need for some reporting standards to be adopted in the field. The review raised concerns about the treatment of missing values and the potential for the exclusion of missing cases from the denominator in calculating prevalence rates to dramatically inflate these rates. At the same time, including missing cases may serve to artificially decrease the prevalence rates. The obvious solution is to report both prevalence estimates as a standard, highlight the difference between the two and analyse any bias in patterns of missing data.

Third, we will need increasingly nuanced research to explore non‐causal processes that may lead to terrorism. Research needs to increasingly disaggregate terrorism into all its forms and sub‐forms, and also consider the links between specific forms of mental health difficulties and terrorist behaviour. In this way, disaggregation of both risk and outcome are required. Although we have observed the disaggregation of mental health difficulties into formal diagnoses and other, less clinical constructs (e.g., psychological problems), disaggregation of the former is lacking, limiting our ability to understand the nature of the relationship between specific, types of disorder and terrorism involvement. In terms of the outcome, we have observed some disaggregation. However, to date, studies have relied primarily on serious criminals for comparison groups and, perhaps unsurprisingly, do not provide evidence that mental health difficulties are associated with terrorist involvement